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ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN FINDING THAT DEGROOT'S ARGUMENTS
WERE N O T MADE IN BAD FAITH AND DENYING
GALLACHER FEES IN DEFENDING THE AWARD.
Mr. deGroot quotes a comment made by the District Court from the bench, to the
effect that deGroot's counsel has never "come in here and argue[d] about the underlying
award" (deGroot's Brief, p. 6, citing R.169). This statement is plain evidence of the
District Court's abuse of discretion, as the court inexplicably ignored deGroot's prior
statements made to the court that were an inconsistent mix of positions on the arbitrator's
decisions. Here are some excerpts:
•

"The plaintiff moves the Court . . . [to] remand this case back to the
arbitrator to make findings . . . as to which party was the successful party
in the arbitration and to receive evidence as to the amount of attorney fees
of the successful party and make findings as to what should be a reasonable
attorneys fee in this matter."
(from Plaintiff's August 3, 2001 Motion, seeking to modify the arbitrator's
award [R. 33])

•

"While it may be argued that the arbitration award should not be modified,
the arbitrator never made a finding as to who was the successful party under
Section 38-1-18, U.C.A. It is necessary in a mechanics lien that such a
finding be made."
(from Plaintiff's August 3, 2001 Memorandum in support the first motion
to modify [R. 28-7])

•

"In the instant case, attorneys fees are not provided for in the original
agreement between the parties, thus any reference to them by the arbitrator
was beyond the powers of the arbitrator."
(from Plaintiff's August 20, 2001 Reply Memorandum [R.84])
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•

[W]e already have a decision from the arbitrator. We don't like it. We
think it was beyond his powers . . . "
(deGroot's counsel at the September 19, 2001 hearing [R. 191, lines 11-13])

•

"The motion of the plaintiff to modify the arbitration decision as to
attorney fees only . . . and to award attorney fees should be granted . . . "
(from Plaintiff's March 5, 2002 Memorandum in support of his second
motion to modify [R. 105])

•

"The only intent of the plaintiff's motion to modify is to make it clear that
any part of the arbitrator's decision appearing to limit the legal power and
duty of this court to award attorney fees is quite clearly beyond the powers
of the arbitrator."
(from Plaintiff's March 22, 2002 Reply Memorandum [R. 131])

From these selections, it is obvious that deGroot's campaign to modify the award to

,

{

(

obtain attorney fees for arbitrating a dispute under a contract that called for binding
arbitration—but not legal fees—was in desperate search of a coherent argument.
<

Unfortunately, that search found deGroot offering conflicting positions that never have
addressed the fundamental legal requirements to modify an arbitrator's ruling.
In trying to explain why the arbitrator supposedly exceeded his authority, deGroot
has argued that the arbitrator did so by mentioning fees and clarifying his decision not to
award them, yet deGroot simultaneously argues the opposite position by claiming that

j

the arbitrator exceeded his authority by not finding that deGroot was entitled to the
award of attorney fees and the amount of those fees! In this latter vein, deGroot even
I
drafted for the District Court's signature an order of referral, to which Gallacher objected
(R. 94-3), that went far beyond the court's decision by requiring the arbitrator to make
I
-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

such findings. The effort was in vain, as the District Court drafted its own Order. (R.
100).
deGroot never offered any evidence that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the
law—thereby exceeding his authority—by ignoring a "clearly governing legal principle,"
Buzas Baseball v. Salt Lake Trappers, 925 P.2d941, 951 (Utah 1996), oi that ihr arbitrator's
decision not to award deGroot fees was any more than a legal position with which
deGroot "manifestly disagreed." Seey Pacific Development v. Orton, 2001 UT 36,115, 23
P.3d 10035,1040.
deGroot fails to acknowledge that in his first motion he also asked the District
Court to modify the arbitrator's decision on the interest rate applicable to the award (R.
27-5; K 180-3) and that Gallacher had to defend the arbitration Award against this
additional attack (R. 66, 63; R. 194). This request had nothing to do with a mechanics'
lien or deGroot's legal fees and everything to do with deGroot's "manifest disagreement"
with the arbitrator's decision. The District Court disposed of this request immediately
and decisively [R. 194; R. 100], but iailed to even consider it when deciding whether to
award Gallacher fees for defending the award.
In maintaining that his quest for an award of arbitration fees under the mechanics'
lien statute met the legal requirements to modify an arbitration award, deGroot cites two
cases, Harris v. Dyer, 637 P.2d () IK (( h t\ t()K I), and Sentry Engineering & Construction &
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Construction v. Mariner's Cay Development Corp., 338 S.E.2d 631, 636 (S.C. 1985). x Even
a casual reading of these cases demonstrates why deGroot's unsupported and bad faith
arguments persist.
In Harris v. Dyer, supra, the Oregon Supreme Court modified an intermediate

<

appellate ruling denying any arbitration fees under the Oregon mechanics' lien statute.
The facts in Harris and the facts in the present case are similar in only two of three critical
{

areas identified by the Oregon Supreme Court. First, the arbitrator there did not award
fees, evidently because, as here, the construction contract had no fee provision. Harris,
637 P.2d, at 919. Second, the arbitration clause was virtually identical to the present
arbitration clause. Id., at 920. The third factual issue spells the distinguishing difference
between the outcome in Harris andrihe*case. The contract in Harris had a key element
not present in the instant contract, a reservation of rights clause which provided that "the
duties and obligations imposed by the Contract Documents and the rights and remedies
available thereunder shall be in addition to and not a limitation of any duties, obligations,
rights and remedies otherwise imposed or available by law." Id.

1

deGroot also references secondary authority, a comment apparently found in 53 Am.
Jur. 2d, Mechanics' Liens, § 463 (p. 445). However, this comment cites as authority only
the Sentry Engineering opinion and can hardly be considered as expanding the scope of
that opinion.
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The Oregon court rejected the contractor's argument, the same one made by
deGroot in the District Court, that the mechanics' lien statute could alone be used to add
attorney fees to the arbitrator's award:
We doubt that when the section speaks of attorney fees to the
"prevailing party" as part of "costs" in a lien foreclosure
proceeding, it means to include more than the statutory
procedures themselves, or that it means to invite foreclosure
suits as a step toward obtaining attorney fees for an
arbitration under a contract that does not provide for fees.
Id. The court also rejected the contractor's argument that the arbitration clause (nearly
identical to the arbitration clause here) preserved for the contractor the rights he would
have had without the arbitration clause, noting that there was "no suggestion that either
the arbitration rules or the award covered attorney fees" and that the arbitration clause
"says nothing about attorney fees." Id. But it was the reservation of rights clause the
Oregon court held was sufficient to award fees incurred in the arbitration proceedings to
the contractor under the Oregon mechanics' lien statute. Id., at 921.
In Sentry Engineering & Construction & Construction v. Mariner's Cay Development
Corp., supra, the South Carolina Supreme Court cited Harris and adopted its reasoning.
The court held that "where a contract providing for arbitration includes a reservation of
rights and the lienor must bring a foreclosure action to enforce an arbitration award an
award of attorneys' fees is proper" under the South Carolina mechanics' lien statute. Id.,
338 S.E.2d, at 636.
-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Since a reservation of rights clause is completely absent from the instant contract,
as is any effort by deGroot to identify one, deGroot's effort to present these easilydistinguishable cases as justification for his repeated efforts to obtain mechanics' lien fees
simply perpetuates his lack of good faith and highlights his unabated desire to re-litigate
a matter settled by the arbitrator.
Another appellate decision that deals with a similar circumstance is illustrative,
because it is a case cited by deGroot in the Docketing Statement of his dismissed appeal2
yet deGroot failed to mention it in his Brief, probably for good reason. In Natkin & Co.
v. Midwesco, Inc., 863 P.2d 1222 (Okla. 1993), the court addressed a somewhat analogous
situation:
Clearly, in the case where neither the agreement to
arbitrate nor the award provides for an allowance for costs
and disbursements, the court may not award them in the
absence of a statutory grant of such right. However, this is
not the circumstance in the present case. Here, the arbitration
agreement specifically called for each party to pay for its own
attorney fees. There is no question therefore, that as to the
arbitration costs, each party must pay its own. However, the
costs herein allowed were incurred pursuant to confirming the
award in district court.

2

In his Brief, deGroot's impliedly lays the blame for his dismissed appeal on Gallacher,
claiming that "after several stipulations for extension had been given, at a time beyond the
last stipulation [deGroot] could not obtain a stipulation of extension of time." (deGroot
Brief, p. 4) To the contrary, deGroot's last request for an extension came after the filing
deadline imposed by the Court's February 13,2003 Order had passed. Gallacher's counsel
was reluctant to stipulate that an Order of the Utah Supreme Court would be ignored.
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863 P. 2d, at 1225 (emphasis added). Unlike the claimant in Natkin, deGroot never had
to confirm the arbitration award by court order since the award was paid, and
acknowledged [R. 163], before the district court disposed of the modification motion.
Therefore, there really were no mechanics' lien proceedings before the District Court in
this case, only the efforts by deGroot to get fees and interest to which he was not entitled.
Also pertinent here is the court's observation in Natkin that "as long as the
arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and action within the
scope of his authority, this Court has no power to reverse his decision" even if the
arbitrator was in error. Id., (citation omitted). Significantly, the court went on to note:
Courts generally look favorably on arbitration statutes and
contracts as a shortcut to substantial justice with a minimum
of court interference. In the present case, the trial court did
not alter the award, rather, the award of attorneys' fees was
for subsequent court action.
Id.j at 1225-6 (emphasis added).
Here, deGroot did not simply ask the District Court to enforce the award and
award fees for that effort alone, he invited the District Court to either alter the award by
changing the interest rate and adding deGroot's arbitration-incurred fees, or to require the
arbitrator to do so—an improper judicial interference of monumental proportions. The
District Court's unwillingness to do so was proper, but its failure to recognize these
invitations as wholly without substance and its failure to award fees to Gallacher for
pointing out this lack of substance was an abuse of discretion.
-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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N o doubt the District Court had difficulty understanding deGroot fs amorphous
arguments. Yet it is abundantly clear that deGroot had no legal or factual basis to relitigate the arbitrator's decision to not award deGroot his arbitration fees; and the District
abused its discretion in failing to award Gallacher his fees incurred in defending the
arbitration award.

The cases cited by deGroot weigh against deGroot's efforts to

legitimize his inconsistent position(s)—that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by
mentioning fees and then by not mentioning fees.
CONCLUSION
The fee provision of the former Utah Arbitration Act and this Court's interpretive
holding in Buzas are tailor-made for an award of fees to Gallacher for defending the
arbitration award from deGroot's groundless attacks. Gallacher therefore respectfully
requests this Court reverse the District Court's finding of no bad faith in deGroot's
mechanics' lien fee arguments and reverse the District Court's denial of Gallacher's
request for fees under § 78-27-56, Utah Code (bad faith fee statute), and under former §
78-31a-16, Utah Code (Arbitration Act costs and fee statute). Gallacher further requests
this Court then remand this case back to the District Court for a determination of the
amount of fees to award Gallacher under either or both of those statutes for defending the
award in the District Court and before this Court.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this m_ day of July, 2003.
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT, L. C.
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Attorneys for Appellees/Cross-Appellants
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